A region lost a customer flow worth hundreds of millions
In 2019 Russian visitors spent approximately €310 million in South Karelia’s businesses. TAK’s material attributes €268 million to shopping. [2; 3, p. 2]
| Russian tourism in South Karelia in 2019 | Scale |
| Trips to South Karelia | Approximately 1.8 million |
| Visitor spending | Approximately €310 million |
| Of which shopping | €268 million |
| Share of day trips | 86 % |
Source: TAK, Foreign visitors in South Karelia 2019, p. 2. Trips do not represent unique individuals. [3]
The border’s economic importance was particularly visible in everyday retail. The Regional Council reports that in 2019 Russian visitors spent over €212 million on everyday goods and around €23 million on clothing. [2]
Shopping supported employees and local services as well as stores. When customers disappear, businesses must find replacement sales, reduce operations or use savings. In Euronews’ February 2026 report, border-region firms describe shorter opening hours, personnel cuts and closures. [4]
An empty shop is a visible trace of economic change. Behind it lie lost sales and livelihoods.
Hotel nights do not show the whole loss
86 percent of Russian visitors’ trips to South Karelia in 2019 were day trips. [3, p. 2]
Day visitors can spend in shops, restaurants and services without booking a hotel. Overnight-stay statistics therefore leave much of the border region’s former customer economy invisible.
Replacement tourism must also be assessed in euros: how much do new visitors buy, which businesses receive the money and how evenly is demand spread through the year?
Around 800 person-years — a loss felt at home
OECD’s 2025 report links the loss of Russian tourism revenue in South Karelia to approximately 800 person-years of employment lost annually. [1, p. 21]
This measures lost labour input, not 800 additional people dismissed every year. It can involve lost jobs, fewer working hours, shorter seasons and unfilled positions.
Households may face lower wages or seek work elsewhere; the region loses purchasing power and tax revenue. Such indirect effects should not be added to tourism income without separate calculation, but matter for the region’s future.
Freight routes changed too
The economic cost extends beyond tourism. OECD describes how the end of Saimaa Canal traffic and Russian wood imports changed industrial transport. Alternative routes burden roads and railways and raise logistics costs. [1, pp. 20 and 91–92]
In 2018 the Saimaa Canal carried about 1.30 million tonnes of freight, of which international traffic accounted for about 1.23 million tonnes. The canal also connected to Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and other European countries. [5, p. 9 and Table 4]
Losing canal connections therefore affects more than Russian trade. OECD reports that replacement transport has increased the importance of the Karelia railway and pressure on its capacity. [1, pp. 91–92]
Longer, more expensive transport leaves businesses less money for other operations and investment.
Impacts extend beyond South Karelia
OECD describes economic shocks in several border regions. Their scale and nature depend on regional economic structures. [1, p. 21]
| Region | Loss or dependence described by OECD |
| South Karelia | Previously about €310 million in annual Russian tourism revenue; its loss is associated with about 800 person-years of employment lost annually. |
| North Karelia | Russian visitors brought approximately €27 million in 2019; replacement markets have been difficult to find. |
| Kainuu | The report describes the loss of earlier annual Russian tourism revenue of €30–40 million at 2012–2013 levels. This historical level is not a current-year estimate. |
| Kymenlaakso | Disrupted forest-industry and logistics chains, together with higher wood costs, have worsened the situation. |
Source: OECD 2025, p. 21. Amounts from different years are not comparable current losses and are not added together.
Why can a national average hide a local crisis?
National business adaptation does not mean a border-region service company has found new customers.
OECD notes a key limitation of the VATT study: it examined firms directly trading goods with Russia. It did not fully cover services, companies linked to Russian tourism and transit, or microenterprises. [1, p. 20]
National research and a border-town entrepreneur’s experience may therefore differ greatly. Regional assessment also needs sales, labour input, use of commercial premises, transport costs and spending by replacement customers.
What can be said confidently about the cost of closure?
The economic loss is real. Not every part can be attributed to one decision.
Tourism and trade changed before the November 2023 closures. The pandemic, Russia’s war, sanctions and counter-sanctions, companies’ withdrawal and the 2022 travel restrictions had already altered connections. See the decisions and restrictions timeline. OECD examines their combined effects on the border regions. [1, chapters 1 and 10; 6]
2019 tourism revenue therefore cannot simply be called the November 2023 decision’s annual net cost. Reopening crossing points alone would not restore previous demand or remove other restrictions.
This does not diminish the losses. It explains why border regions need lasting solutions and transparent monitoring.
Eastern Finland’s vitality matters to all Finland
The region’s future depends on business conditions, jobs and whether people can build lives there. New customers, markets and investments are needed; success must be measured by actual replacement demand and work.
Economic consequences of security decisions must be visible. Businesses and residents need a credible way forward.
Sources and interpreting the figures
1. OECD (2025): Transition Strategies for Finland’s Eastern and South-Eastern Border Regions: Adapting to Geopolitical Change. Publication and report ↗. Printed pages 20–21: sectors, VATT study scope and regional impacts; 90: estimate of about €1 million in daily losses in South Karelia; 91–92: transport and the Karelia railway. PDF pages are two higher than printed page numbers. Regional estimates are not independently calculated causal impact estimates by this website.
2. Regional Council of South Karelia (13.5.2020): Russian tourism continued growing in 2019 ↗. Based on TAK’s border study. Historical 2019 amounts, not updated to 2026 prices.
3. Research and Analysis Centre TAK Oy (May 2020): Foreign visitors in South Karelia 2019, p. 2. Figures: 1.8 million, €310 million, €268 million and 86%. A public URL for the full report is unavailable. The Regional Council’s release provides context. Totals for all foreign visitors differ slightly between the image and release and are not combined in this calculation.
4. Euronews (27.2.2026): Finnish communities near closed Russian border continue to suffer economically ↗. Businesses’ adaptation measures; a journalistic snapshot, not a calculation of total losses.
5. Traficom (2019): Saimaa Canal and other lock canal traffic statistics 2018, statistical publications 15/2019, p. 9 and Table 4, pp. 15–16. Historical traffic statistics; see also sources on the border’s importance.
6. Ministry for Foreign Affairs (29.9.2022): Finland significantly restricts Russian tourist travel through a government resolution, archived release. Travel restrictions effective from 30.9.2022.
Evidence checked on 22.10.2026. This is an independent synthesis and interpretation; OECD has not approved or endorsed this website’s positions.